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Since 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been de-
veloping and implementing an increasingly comprehensive system of "con-
trolled trading options" for air pollution control.' These programs intro-
duce a limited market for the allocation of emissions among sources of air
pollution. Starting with existing source-specific standards' as a baseline,
policies such as bubbles,' emissions banks," netting' and offsets' allow
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1. Controlled trading options are the methods that have been developed at EPA to allow substitu-
tion of emissions between sources. A definition and explanation of the concept is contained in OFFICE
OF PLANNING & MGMT., U.S. EPA, SMARTER REGULATION (1981) [hereinafter cited as SMARTER
REGULATION]. For a legal analysis of how this program is related to controlling legislation, see Lan-
dau, Who Owns the Air? The Emissions Offset Concept and Its Implementation, 9 ENVTL. L. 575
(1979).
2. The principal method of controlling emissions into the atmosphere is to set one of two types of
technical standards: an input standard, which requires that a specific abatement method be adopted,
or an output standard, which sets a limit on the rate at which a pollutant can be emitted from a
source. Separate standards are usually written for each orifice through which pollutants may be emit-
ted, so that a given factory may have a very large number of standards that apply to it. Controlled
trading options apply to trades of emissions among sources for which standards have already been
written. See SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 1, at 3-5. For an analysis of how the standard-setting
process works, see Noll, The Feasibility of Tradable Emissions Permits in the United States, in PUB-
LIC SECTOR ECONOMICS. (J. Finsinger, ed. 1983).
3. A bubble is a situation in which the owners of a plant may increase emissions from one source if
they make a corresponding decrease in emissions from another source at the same plant. See SMARTER
REGULATION, supra note 1, at 6.
4. An emissions bank is a procedure whereby emissions at a source are reduced below the applica-
ble standard and the source owner is given a credit for the emissions reduction that can later be sold to
another firm to allow it to increase its emissions. The regulatory authority acts as a kind of bank,
taking "deposits" of emissions credits which can later be "withdrawals" by a new or expanding plant.
See id. at 8.
5. Netting is the process by which an expanded or remodeled plant in a Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) region can escape an otherwise required new source review if the change in the
facility does not cause a significant net increase in emissions. This amounts to using the bubble con-
cept to cover cases in which new sources are added to a plant, but the total amount of emissions does
not change significantly. See Palmisano, Have Markets for Trading Emission Reduction Credits
Failed or Succeeded? 7 (1982) (Office of Policy & Resource Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2, U.S.
EPA).
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firms to negotiate - within limits - trades of emissions permits in a
manner that satisfies air quality standards at lower total costs. These
trades, once agreed upon by the parties, in most cases must then be pro-
posed to regulators as amendments to the existing set of source-specific
standards.7
EPA's controlled trading policy places constraints on the amount of
emissions from sources before and after a trade is consummated. For ex-
ample, new sources must satisfy new source performance standards in any
case, and can use trades only to acquire permits for the emissions released
if these standards are satisfied.' A logical next step in reforming air pollu-
tion regulation is to adopt a more comprehensive marketable permits sys-
tem by eliminating the requirements that trades be reviewed on a case-by-
case basis by regulators, that a source be in compliance with standards
prior to trading, and that new facilities remain in compliance with new
source performance standards. Regulators adopting this form of tradable
emissions permits would no longer set source-specific technical standards
as a baseline for further trades. Instead, the tasks facing the regulator
would be to set overall ambient air quality standards, to limit total emis-
sions in each geographic region to an amount that satisfies these stan-
dards, to organize the market institutions for allocating emissions among
sources, and then to enforce the overall standards by detecting and fining
sources that emit more pollutants than their permits allow.
In this paper we will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the
workability of an efficient market in tradable emissions permits. Our pur-
pose is to explore the narrower topic of how the political feasibility and
economic efficiency of tradable permits are affected by the status quo ante
of the regulatory environment and by the way in which permits markets
are designed.
Our analysis of political feasibility is not exhaustive. It focuses on two
groups that are likely to play important roles in the debate about reform
of environmental regulation: (1) industrial sources of emissions and (2)
regulators, especially energy regulatory officials. Our hypothesis, discussed
more fully in the next section of the paper, is that the probability that a
market for emissions permits will be adopted is significantly affected by
6. Offsets are direct sales of emissions permits between companies. See SMARTER REGULATION,
supra note 1, at 7. See also infra note 18 and accompanying text.
7. For a description of the procedures for integrating permit trades into a state's set of standards for
achieving air quality objectives, see ICF, INC., EMISSIONS REDUCTION BANKING MANUAL (1981)
(U.S. EPA Emission Reduction Banking and Trading Publication BG200, Washington, D.C.). For a
more thorough analysis of the process for implementing controlled trading options, see Hahn & Noll,
Implementing Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION (L. Cramer & F.
Thompson eds. 1982).
8.. Revised EPA Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979).
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the positions of these two groups. For industrial sources, we assume that
the primary factor affecting their stand on this type of reform will be its
economic impact on them, with the vigor of their participation correlated
to the size of their financial stakes in the outcome.' With respect to regu-
lators of the energy sector, their support or opposition is assumed to be
determined by the extent to which a tradable emissions permits system is
regarded as facilitating or inhibiting their objectives in energy regulation.
Other groups, of course, will play a role in the debate over any reform of
environmental policy, including the general public, environmental organi-
zations, producers of abatement equipment, energy companies, and con-
sumers of polluting products. A complete analysis of the politics of regula-
tory reform would have to take into account the likely influence of these
groups and how various types of reform would affect their participation in
the policy process.
Before examining the issue of political feasibility, we will briefly sum-
marize the principal attractions and potential problems of a market for
emissions permits. A system of environmental regulation that places rela-
tively few constraints on trades of emissions permits has a number of im-
portant theoretical advantages.'0 First, assuming that businesses seek to
minimize costs, a competitive market for permits achieves a given emis-
sions target at minimum total cost. By contrast, environmental regulators
are unlikely to possess sufficiently precise information about abatement
technologies to find the minimum-cost strategy for achieving their environ-
mental objectives. Moreover, the separation of authority over different
types of sources among federal, state, and local regulators is a barrier to
finding efficient trade-offs of emissions between sources that are regulated
by different governmental entities.
A second theoretical advantage of tradable permits is that they ease
both the adoption of new abatement technology and the entry and exit of
pollution sources. With source-specific regulation, every new abatement
technology and every new source must obtain specific regulatory ap-
proval.1" This requirement imposes costs of delay and process that not
only inhibit the adoption of more efficient abatement technologies, but also
restrict structural change in the economy by making new production facil-
ities less attractive to investors. By contrast, a tradable permits system
9. Theories of the regulatory process typically emphasize the role of narrow economic self-interest
in motivating participation in the regulatory process and influencing policy outcomes. See M. BERN.
STEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955) R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULA-
TION (1971); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
10. For an interesting and thorough discussion of this approach, see J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROP-
ERTY AND PRICES (1968).
11. For a detailed analysis of the process of standard setting in air pollution regulation, see Peder-
sen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1981).
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makes emissions more like other inputs to a production process in that
emissions permits, like other inputs, must be acquired through a market.
To the extent that a permits market is "thick" - that is, characterized by
easily arranged transactions at predictable prices - the problem of ac-
quiring new permits (or selling old ones) would not differ materially from
the problems of participating in markets for labor, raw materials, land, or
other inputs.1
The third advantage of tradable permits is that they avoid some of the
costs of the regulatory process itself. Regulators would not need to devote
resources to identifying specific technical fixes for a long list of emissions
sources and to undertaking a protracted procedure for changing standards
for any particular source. Regulated firms would not need to incur the
costs of defending their positions in' these same proceedings.
The practical availability of these theoretical advantages depends on
whether a market for emissions permits is feasible in both the legal and
economic senses. Among the questions of legal feasibility are issues per-
taining to the establishment of an emissions baseline from which trades
can be made and to the choice of methods for monitoring and enforcing
the permits. The questions of economic feasibility center on whether an
efficient market is viable. A competitive market requires a sufficiently
large number of buyers and sellers so that no buyer or seller has a large
enough share of the market to extract from it significant monopsony or
monopoly profits. Consequently, the feasibility of a permits market is in
part an empirical issue that turns on the number, geographic distribution,
and abatement cost functions of the sources of pollution in a region, on the
technical relationship between emissions and pollution, and on the specific
legal and institutional features of the permits market."' We have ex-
amined these issues for a specific pollutant in a specific airshed - atmo-
12. A thick market is one in which trades are frequent and trading partners are easy to find so that
a person wishing to make a trade can easily estimate the price and find a trading partner. Thus, the
market has relatively few uncertainties and relatively low transactions costs. For a discussion of the
problem of market thickness in implementing tradable emissions permits, see Hahn & Noll, Design-
ing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 137
(W. Magat ed. 1982).
13. Each of the factors mentioned here affects the structure of the permits market. Profit-maximiz-
ing firms will seek to minimize the sum of abatement costs and the market value of permit holdings.
Hence, abatement costs enter into the calculation by each polluting company of its demand for per-
mits. The emissions from each source then undergo complicated chemical reactions and, depending on
meteorological conditions.and the geography of the region, combine with emissions from other sources
to produce a pattern of pollution. The technical features of the process determine the definition of a
region in which regulators can rationally establish an overall ceiling on emissions and in which per-
mits can be traded through a market without producing a change in overall air quality. For a detailed
exposition of how these technical matters affect the definition and structure of a permits market, see
Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY
395 (1972).
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spheric sulfate particulates in Los Angeles - and have concluded that an
efficient permits market can be designed to solve that particular
problem."
Unfortunately, legal and economic feasibility is not the only issue to be
resolved. The implementation of tradable emissions permits is further
complicated by other regulatory programs. Specifically, current environ-
mental and energy regulation affects the expected performance of a per-
mits market and the attitudes of regulated firms, regulators, environmen-
talists, and the general public about making emissions permits tradable.
This paper examines the interactions between tradable emissions and
three current regulatory policies, each of which affects the political feasi-
bility of a permits market. The first of these policies is the present method
of regulating emissions from stationary sources, which grants polluting
firms an implicit property right in the emissions permitted. In effect, part
of the wealth of existing polluters is in the form of permits to operate
according to established source-specific standards. These same firms would
participate in a permits market. A tradable permits program can threaten
existing wealth positions, depending on the procedures adopted for dealing
with established permits. How these wealth positions would be altered, if
at all, by a permits market affects the desirability of this reform to firms
that are in compliance with current standards, and hence their political
resistance to the reform. This can severely limit the range of politically
feasible market institutions for implementing tradable permits, a problem
addressed in the next section.
The second regulatory interaction examined here is the relationship of
environmental policy to natural gas regulation. Nearly all man-made air
pollution is caused by processing and burning hydrocarbon fuels."5 Conse-
quently, policies that affect the price and availability of fuels will also
affect the cost of attaining environmental policy goals. Section II of this
paper examines the relationship between a tradable permits program for
dealing with sulfate particulates in Los Angeles and the status of natural
gas regulation. The principal findings reported in Section II are that the
price and availability of natural gas are the most important factors influ-
encing the cost of abating sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles, and
constitute the greatest source of uncertainty in environmental policy in
that region.
The third instance of regulatory interaction to be analyzed is the effect
14. G. CASS, R. HAHN & R. NOLL, IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS FOR SULFUR
OXIDES EMISSIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN: FINAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA AIR RE-
SOURCES BOARD (June 30, 1982).
15. For a list of the major air pollutants and their primary sources, see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES,
ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 45-47 (1979).
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of public utility regulation on the performance of a market for emissions
permits. Approximately half of the sulfur oxides emissions in Los Ange-
les, and a larger proportion in some other regions, emanates from electric
power generation facilities." Electric utilities are heavily regulated by
public utility commissions, which control prices and profits by determin-
ing the amount of utility costs that can be recovered from ratepayers.
Whether an electric utility will respond to an incentive-based regulatory
reform like tradable emissions permits in a manner that achieves pollution
abatement at minimum cost depends upon the treatment of various envi-
ronmental costs and incentive methods by public utility regulators. This
topic is examined in Section III.
Because institutional problems are man-made, they pose no insur-
mountable barrier, in principle, to the implementation of tradable emis-
sions permits. Nevertheless, they illustrate that reform of one domain of
regulation can easily be frustrated by other regulatory policies, and that
the feasibility of effective reform depends on dealing simultaneously with
all regulatory policies that significantly affect polluting activities, directly
or indirectly.
I. Existing Source-Specific Standards as a Constraint on Reform
One of EPA's controlled trading options is the offset policy. It arose in
response to a dilemma facing regions that are not in compliance with am-
bient air quality standards. In these regions, no net addition to emissions
can be created.17 If this were to lead to a zero emissions standard for new
or expanding sources, it would essentially preclude any economic expan-
sion as well as any possibility for competitive entry. To avoid this out-
come, environmental regulators developed the offset policy, a procedure
whereby new and expanding sources of pollution could satisfy the zero-
emissions requirement by abating pollution elsewhere in the region, rather
than by constructing a facility that actually produced no emissions. "
Under the offset policy, a new or expanding source negotiates with an old
source that is in compliance with its standards. The purpose of this bar-
gaining is to reach an agreement whereby the new or expanding source
pays the old source a mutually acceptable amount in return for the latter
16. G. CASS, METHODS FOR SULFATE AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT WITH APPLICATIONS TO Los
ANGELES 195 (1974) (Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute of Technology). See
also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY AND STATIONARY SOURCE EMISSION CONTROL, S.
DOC. NO. 4, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
17. NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIR QUALITY, TO BREATHE CLEAN AIR, pt. 3, ch. 4 (1981), describes
the policy developed for nonattainment areas by EPA pursuant to the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act. Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
18. Revised EPA Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979).
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reducing its emissions by at least as much as the former will add to the
regional emissions inventory.
The major constraint placed on new or expanding firms was the re-
quirement that they satisfy applicable standards for new sources after the
trade is consummated. 5 ' At minimum this can mean compliance with fed-
eral new source performance standards (NSPS). In regions that are not in
compliance with federal ambient air quality standards (nonattainment ar-
eas), new sources are required to achieve the Lowest Achievable Emis-
sions Rate (LAER). This is distinguished from the Best Available Control
Technology (BACT), a requirement applied to new sources in regions
that are in compliance with ambient air quality standards but that are
designated as Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regions.'
The distinctions among NSPS, LAER, and BACT, although of debatable
practical significance,'" were intended to establish a commitment to de-
velop a policy for nonattainment areas that would not allow firms to re-
duce emissions from old sources as a means of satisfying the zero-emis-
sions limit until every available technical control had been applied to the
new facility." As a political matter, the LAER requirement assured envi-
ronmentalists that offsets would not cause a significant relaxation of emis-
sions limits or retard progress toward achieving air quality objectives.
Another controlled trading option is the bubble policy. Regulators nor-
mally set standards for each point at a facility where emissions escape;
19. For a detailed explanation of how the offset policy works, see del Calvoy Gonzalez, Markets in
Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377 (1981).
20. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) are federal standards, set by either Congress or
EPA, that establish a nationwide minimum requirement for categories of sources that are deemed to
be important causes of hazardous pollutants. In adopting NSPS, EPA can take account of costs and
energy policy considerations, and need not require the state of the art in abatement technology. In
addition, states are required to adopt BACT standards on a case-by-case basis for major new sources
in PSD areas. In the development of a BACT standard, questions of economic and technical feasibil-
ity as well as the contribution of the new source to ambient air quality, given geographic and meteoro-
logical conditions, can be taken into account, but the standard must be at least as stringent as NSPS.
Finally, in nonattainment areas, states must adopt LAER standards for new sources. LAER is defined
as either of the following: the most stringent standard contained in the implementation plan of any
state or the most stringent emissions limit achieved in practice anywhere. Questions of economic and
technical feasibility are not supposed to play a role in determining LAER. Moreover, LAER is a
general standard applicable to all sources in nonattainment regions and hence is not determined on a
case-by-case basis. For a thorough discussion of these distinctions, see NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIR
QUALITY, supra note 17, pt. 3, chs. 4, 5 & 7.
21. Although in theory there are three different types of standards for new sources (NSPS, BACT
and LAER), "in practice, these will all be defined about the same, but only after lengthy negotiations
in each case." FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 384 (1979). One study for
the National Commission on Air Quality reviewed 54 cases in which LAER standards had been
adopted, and found that in all but two cases the LAER standard was the same as the NSPS. The
principal reason for the equivalence of the three types of standards is thought to be that regulators do
not have sufficient information about alternative abatement methods to make practical distinctions
among them. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIR QUALITY, supra note 17, at 3.4-51.
22. NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIR QUALITY, supra note 17, at 3.4-43.
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hence, a complicated production facility can have numerous separately
regulated sources. The bubble policy allowed a firm to treat all of the
sources at one facility as if they were one combined source, and to adopt
any technical methods that would reduce total emissions - even if this
meant allowing emissions to increase at some of the sources. 8 In essence,
this policy treats a single plant as a tiny tradable permits market, in
which the owners of the plant can make trades of emissions among
sources as long as the result is a net reduction in total emissions.
The offset and bubble policies had two important consequences. First,
they recognized, albeit implicitly, that giving a firm a permit to operate a
polluting facility if it is in compliance with regulatory standards conveys a
limited property right. Standards, once promulgated, establish the share of
a firm in the overall emissions limit for a region, just as a real estate
acquisition conveys to the firm a share in the total amount of land that is
zoned for a particular use. Of course, the limitations, conditions and se-
curity of rights differ between permits to emit and titles to land.' 4 Never-
theless, because having a permit is clearly superior to not having one -
indeed, it is essential to operations, just as is having rights to use the land
- the permit constitutes a valuable asset to a firm.
The second important consequence of controlled trading options was
that the ability to make trades of emissions between sources enhanced the
value of emissions permits. If source-specific standards at a plant are eco-
nomically inefficient because marginal abatement costs differ among
sources, bubbles allow the firm to shuffle permits among its sources so as
to reduce total compliance costs - and hence enhance the value of the
company. As long as incremental abatement costs are lower for old
sources than for new sources in compliance with the controlling new
source standard - a condition that is guaranteed by the NSPS, BACT
and LAER policies - the offset policy enhances the value of permits by
allowing them to be sold for more than the costs of further abatement.
A. Political Consequences of Controlled Trading
The significance of the property right implicit in emissions permits lies
in the role that this right plays in shaping the politics of change in envi-
ronmental policy. To the extent that political participation - and hence
the politically feasible set of changes in policy - is determined by the
23. Air Pollution Control; Recommendation for Alternative Emission Reduction Options Within
State Implementation Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,780 (1979) (EPA Policy Statement).
24. For a discussion of the legal position of emissions permits, see Krier, Some Legal Aspects of
Tradable Emissions Permits for Air Pollution in Southern California, in 2 CASS, HAHN & NOLL,
supra note 3, ch. 4.
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economic stakes that affected parties have in the policy, the very existence
of a standard-setting process establishes constraints on feasible reforms.
For example, Ackerman and Hassler have argued that the new source
performance standards for coal-fired power plants were written into the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 because of the benefits the standards
would confer on eastern coal interests and firms already holding permits. 5
Crandall adds the additional insight that the winning political coalition
behind the NSPS for power plants included Northeastern and Midwest-
ern interests that were trying to slow the growth of the Sunbelt states."
These are specific examples of a more general feature of the existing ap-
proach to air pollution regulation: Source-specific standards, although re-
sisted prior to their adoption, can be competitively advantageous to estab-
lished firms because they give old sources a cost advantage over new ones
and erect an entry barrier to potential competitors. Moreover, the emis-
sions permits associated with source-specific standards are valuable assets
because they may eventually be sold for more than the cost of an offsetting
amount of abatement. Any reform proposal that undermines these valua-
ble attributes of existing permits is likely to face resistance from industrial
polluters who already hold permits.
Of course, the importance of the constraints created by the system of
source-specific standards turns on the value of existing permits compared
to the reductions in overall abatement costs that a market in permits could
produce. Our work on the likely effects of implementing tradable emis-
sions permits for sulfur oxides (SOx) emissions in Los Angeles indicates
that the wealth embodied in existing permits is indeed quite substantial,
probably much greater than the efficiency gains that could be captured by
allowing these permits to be fully tradable. Figure 1 shows the demand
curve for a permit to emit a ton of S02-equivalent in Los Angeles for one
day.2 The demand curve is calculated by estimating the abatement cost
function for each source category in Los Angeles,28 and solving for the
cost-minimizing distribution of emissions among sources for each ceiling
on total emissions."9 The values along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 re-
25. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR, (1981).
26. Crandall, Controlling Industrial Pollution: The Economics and Politics of Clean Air, in REGU-
LATORY REFORM IN PUBLIC UTILITIES, (Crew ed. 1982).
27. Sulfur is emitted in many chemical forms, some of which are sulfates but the most important of
which is S02. As S02 is transported in the atmosphere, it is converted to sulfates. Consequently, for
purposes of sulfate air quality management, the relevant measure of emissions is the total amount of
sulfur emitted. Because the various chemical compounds that contain sulfur have different weights per
unit of sulfur content, the standard practice is to convert to S02-equivalent weights - that is, the
amount of S02 that would contain the same amount of sulfur. See CASS, supra note 16, ch. 2.
28. For further details on abatement costs, see 3 CASS, HAHN & NOLL, supra note 14.
29. The reason for selecting the emissions ceilings shown in Figure I is discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 44-45.
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present possible ceilings on total emissions."' The standards currently in
place allow approximately 350 tons per day of S02-equivalent to be re-
leased into the atmosphere in Los Angeles."' As the figure indicates, at
350 tons per day a permit to emit one ton for one day would be worth
$470. This translates into a permit value of over $170,000 if the holder
can emit one ton per day for an entire year. Thus, the aggregate value of
existing permits to emit 350 tons per day for a year would be approxi-
mately $60 million if permits were freely tradable. By contrast, total an-
nual compliance costs under the distribution of permits by a market would
total an estimated $123 million, and the efficiency gain from a market -
the reduction in estimated compliance costs from correcting current ineffi-
ciencies - would be less than $10 million.32 These calculations reveal
that regulation of SOx emissions in Los Angeles has created a new prop-
erty right - a permit to emit - that is half as valuable as the compliance
costs that have been undertaken to meet existing standards and roughly
ten times as valuable as the short-run efficiency gains to be derived from
making permits freely tradable.
30. These calculations are based on three assumptions: (1) that the market for permits is competi-
tive and hence achieves a given emissions target at minimum total cost; (2) that use of natural gas as a
boiler fuel is constrained somewhat below the market-clearing quantity at deregulated prices, as has
been the case during the early 1980's due to the remaining vestiges of price and allocation regulation
of natural gas; and (3) that each firm's production is unchanged by the introduction of a permits
market.
31. Cass, Technical Aspects of the Los Angeles Sulfur Oxides Air Quality Problem, in 2 CASS,
HAHN & NOLL, supra note 14, at 69.
32. The $123 million figure is the sum of annualized expenditures on abatement by all regulated
source categories if abatement costs are minimized. This is less than a $10 million savings over our
estimate of current annualized abatement costs, using the same cost data and the emissions inventory
by source category under current regulations. The estimated compliance cost under a market arrange-
ment is probably biased upwards, and the short-run efficiency gain from a market biased downwards,
to the extent that control methods are available that have not been incorporated into our abatement
cost functions. Only abatement methods for which we could obtain documentation in public sources
have been included; this causes us to exclude changes in production processes that are available to
firms but are trade secrets, and control methods available to sources that have not yet been regulated.
In addition, long-run efficiency gains will be greater to the extent that the market stimulates cost-
saving innovations in abatement technology and reduces barriers to economic change. For further
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These numbers explain industry resistance to the two most straightfor-
ward alternative methods for introducing incentive-based environmental
regulation: an emissions tax or an auction of emissions permits. According
to our calculations, the 1980 concentration of sulfate particulates in Los
Angeles could be attained if all standards were abandoned and replaced
by an emissions tax equal to approximately twenty-five cents per pound of
SO2 -equivalent emissions."3 Alternatively, the state could auction off per-
mits to emit 350 tons per day. The net result of either policy would be to
transfer approximately $60 million a year from existing pollution sources
to the state with no attendant improvement in air quality and with a re-
duction of only a few million dollars in total annual abatement
expenditures.
Allowing present polluters to keep all of the $60 million annual value
of existing emissions permits is not, of course, an insurmountable political
constraint on the feasible set of environmental reforms."' It is more a fac-
tor to be considered in designing a system of tradable permits. The cur-
rent approach, which uses existing standards as the baseline from which
trades can be made, is politically attractive because it grandfathers the
wealth position of current permit holders. Unfortunately, simply to grand-
father permits and to let polluters arrange trades is not the most efficient
way to organize a market, because (1) it requires bilateral negotiations;
(2) it does not incorporate a mechanism whereby transaction terms be-
come matters of public record (and hence convey meaningful information
to potential participants in the market); and (3) it can cause severe market
structure problems. Our calculations indicate that in Los Angeles the
strategy of grandfathering produces a market that is highly concentrated
on the demand side. 5
33. The emissions tax that would produce the same emissions as current source-specific standards
is the market value of a permit to emit a pound of sulfur. The figure of twenty-five cents was derived
by dividing the $470 value of a permit to emit one ton by 2000 pounds.
34. The effect on equilibrium prices and wages of the introduction of a tradable permits system
does not depend on whether, initially, firms are given or must purchase the permits. In either case, the
permits have an opportunity cost equal to their market price, and it is this opportunity cost that enters
into the decisions of polluting firms about production plans and product prices. The only exception to
this general theoretical observation is the electric utility industry, in which economic regulation may
cause the distinction between granted and purchased permits to matter in setting electricity prices.
This is the subject of Section III infra.
35. See Hahn & Noll, supra note 12, at 126, for a detailed analysis of the problems of market
structure. The essence of the problem is that public utilities are usually required to undertake signifi-
cantly more costly abatement methods than other major sources. Consequently, in a market in which
firms can trade existing permits, the utilities can constitute the entire demand side of the market. In
Los Angeles, we estimate that the largest utility would account for approximately 85 percent of total
demand, and the remainder would be from other utilities.
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B. The Zero Revenue Auction of Permits
If the only available methods for implementing tradable permits were to
have the state sell them or to let polluters negotiate from the baseline of
current emissions standards, the prospects for effective reform would be
gloomy. Fortunately, an alternative is available: a "Zero Revenue Auc-
tion." 6 This procedure allocates permits provisionally on the basis of cur-
rent emissions, but uses a type of auction to make the final allocation. All
participants in the emissions market must submit a demand curve for per-
mits, i.e., a statement of the quantity of permits to be purchased for each
possible price. Probably most firms would express their demand curves as
a step function - for all prices below $A, purchase will equal x; for
prices between $A and $(A + B), purchases will be y; and so on. These
individual demand curves are then added to construct a market demand
curve for permits. The market price of a permit is determined by the
intersection of the cumulative demand curve with the ceiling on total emis-
sions. A firm's final allocation is its demand at this price. Each firm then
pays an amount equal to the permit price times its final allocation, and
receives back an amount equal to the price times its provisional allocation.
Net payments to the state are zero for all firms taken together. For each
firm, a net payment differing from zero represents an improvement from
the status quo ante in terms of the sum of abatement costs plus net permit
payments as long as the firm reports a demand curve that is not perversely
untruthful. 1 This procedure preserves the wealth inherent in existing
permits; provides a thick market with low transactions costs; results in a
public price signal for future reference by firms contemplating entry or
expansion of polluting facilities; and attacks the market structure problem
by placing all firms on the demand side of the market. The drawbacks of
the Zero Revenue Auction are that it is somewhat more difficult to under-
stand than simple grandfathering and that it makes participation in the
market mandatory, rather than voluntary. The latter drawback is miti-
gated by the fact that firms can guarantee a final allocation equal to the
provisional one at no net cost by reporting a perfectly inelastic demand at
the provisional quantity. If every firm so reported, the provisional alloca-
tion would be the final allocation, and neither dollars nor permits would
change hands; however, unless the provisional allocation minimizes abate-
36. Hahn & Noll, supra note 12.
37. A firm that perceives that it can affect the equilibrium price of permits will not necessarily
report its true demand curve; however, the trades that result will still be mutually beneficial to all
firms in the market. The amount of monopoly power and the extent to which market structure
problems cause an inefficient distribution of permits depend on the method used to initialize the mar-
ket. For a detailed treatment of these issues, see Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property
Rights, Q. J. OF ECON. (forthcoming).
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ment costs for the associated emissions ceilings, firms would be acting ir-
rationally if they all reported perfectly inelastic demands. Thus, it appears
that the Zero Revenue Auction can surmount the barriers, created by cur-
rent regulations, to implementing an efficient tradable permits system.
II. Natural Gas Regulation as a Constraint on Environmental Reform
The calculations in the preceding section were based upon a specific
assumption about the availability and price of natural gas. It is well-docu-
mented that price regulation of natural gas at the wellhead has led to
excess demand."8 As regulation of natural gas - especially new discover-
ies - has gradually been withdrawn,89 supplies have increased. Because
natural gas is exceptionally clean-burning, it is an attractive fuel for use
in regions suffering from heavy air pollution. For the problem at hand -
sulfate particulates in Los Angeles - it is especially attractive because it
contains virtually no sulfur. Hence, substitution of gas for oil - the prin-
cipal fuel burned in Los Angeles boilers - is the least expensive abate-
ment strategy available for any pollution source that can burn both fuels.
A. The Availability of Natural Gas
The importance of the availability of natural gas is illustrated in Table
1, which shows the annual abatement cost for satisfying various limits on
total emissions under three different assumptions about the availability of
natural gas. All calculations assume that the price of natural gas equals
the BTU-equivalent price of high-sulfur residual fuel oil. The "High"
and "Low" natural gas cases are drawn from projections of the supply of
natural gas to Los Angeles that were made in the mid-1970's, whereas the
38. See, e.g., MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J.L. & ECON. 167
(1973).
39. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. V 1981), sets forth a
procedure that was expected to deregulate gas gradually over a period of several years.
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middle column is based on the actual use of gas in 1980.40
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ABATEMENT COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVE
CEILINGS ON SOX EMISSIONS UNDER THREE ASSUMPTIONS
REGARDING NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES
(In Millions of 1977 Dollars)
NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
SULFUR OXIDES
EMISSIONS High Actual Low
(tons/day) Forecast 1980 Forecast
150 3109 $ 182 $ 622
200 93 158 566
250 81 144 524
300 72 131 487
350 64 123 459
400 56 114 440
450 49 106 424
Source: Calculated by authors from data on abatement costs by source category.
Abatement costs under the three conditions of natural gas supply have
been calculated for a wide range of aggregate emissions of SOx, as shown
in the first column of Table 1. This range includes all of the relevant
emissions ceilings for purposes of policy analysis. Emissions of SOx in Los
Angeles currently range between 325 and 350 tons per day, averaged over
a year."1 This brings Los Angeles almost into compliance with the rele-
vant federal ambient air quality standards for S02 and for total sus-
pended particulates.' 2 However, approximately a third of the degradation
40. The low availability case represents the predictions then being made about gas supplies for the
1980's, and reflects the view then common that gas supplies would continue to dwindle. Shortly before
the development of the "gas bubble," i.e., unanticipated excess supply in the late 1970's, gas supplies
in Los Angeles were approaching this level. The high supply case represents a relatively minor
shortfall of natural gas supplies from market-clearing quantities at deregulated prices. It is much
closer to the actual availability of gas in 1980 - the middle column of the table - than is the low
availability case. All three cases assume that existing regulations establishing priorities of user classes,
rather than the market, will be used to allocate gas. This assigns highest priority to residential users,
and lowest priority to electric generation facilities. In the low and high availability cases, we assigned
gas to categories of users according to these priorities. The 1980 case reflects the average pattern of
use that actually took place, which may have departed slightly from the assignment we have assumed
to the extent that supplies and demands varied through the year. In each case we have assumed that
the price of natural gas equals the BTU-equivalent price of high-sulfur residual fuel oil. In fact, gas
prices have been somewhat lower than this, so that the availability of natural gas has produced even
greater cost savings than are shown in the table. For more details, see Cass, The Sulfur Oxides
Emission Potential of the South Coast Air Basin in the Early 1980s, in 3 CASS, HAHN & NOLL, supra
note 14, at app. E.
41. Cass, supra note 31, at 66-71.
42. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., SULFUR DIOXIDE/SULFATE CONTROL STUDY:
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in visibility in Los Angeles is still due to sulfate particulates,43 and sulfur
compounds are a major component of acid rain and acid fog."" Conse-
quently, California has set an ambient air quality standard for sulfate
particulates that is substantially more rigorous than federal standards and
that would require a reduction in emissions to an estimated 150 tons per
day. By contrast, under the assumption of low natural gas availability -
the conditions that were threatened in the mid-1970's - existing stan-
dards would produce emissions of about 420 tons per day.4 Thus, the
emissions ceilings shown in Table 1 range from the outcome with existing
standards and low natural gas supplies to compliance with state ambient
air quality standards.
Table 1 makes apparent the dramatic effect of the availability of natu-
ral gas on abatement costs. Achieving the state standard (150 tons) under
the high-availability case is approximately one-fourth as expensive as
maintaining the status quo level of emissions (350 tons) if natural gas
supplies are curtailed to the low-availability case. On the other hand, if
gas supplies increase from the actual 1980 quantity to those projected in
the high-availability case, the state ambient air quality standard can be
satisfied while simultaneously reducing compliance costs by an estimated
$14 million. Obviously, the future of environmental policy in Los Angeles
- and in other regions in which natural gas can be an important substi-
tute fuel for coal or oil - depends heavily on the availability of natural
gas.
B. The Price of Natural Gas
Environmental compliance costs also depend on the price of natural gas.
Most forecasts of the effect of deregulation on the price of natural gas
predict that complete deregulation in the early 1980's would cause the
price to rise steadily until 1990, but not all the way to the BTU-
equivalent price for very low-sulfur residual fuel oil (0.25 percent sulfur
content). 4 The latter type of fuel is, now required for electric utilities in
STAFF REPORT, (1981).
43. CASS, supra note 16, ch. 6.
44. Id. at 4.
45. These statements about the relationships between emissions and compliance with various air
quality standards are based upon information in SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., supra
note 42. This infdrmation is summarized in Cass, supra note 31, at 62.
46. For example, the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis of the Department of Energy fore-
casts a 1990 price slightly less than halfway between high-sulfur and low-sulfur residual fuel oil
prices, whereas the Energy Information Administration of the same department forecasts that in most
parts of the country gas will not reach even the price of high-sulfur residual fuel oil. OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING & ANALYSIS, Div. OF ENERGY REGULATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, A STUDY OF
ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978 (Nov. 1981) (Doc. No. DOE/PE-0031);
3 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (Feb.




PERMIT PRICES WITH AND WITHOUT NATURAL GAS DECONTROL
FOR VARIOUS EMISSIONS CEILINGSa
Emissions ASSUMPTION ABOUT NATURAL GAS AVAILABILITY AND PRICE
in
SO,-equiv. Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 High Actual Low
Tons/Day (2.5%S) (1.0%S) (0.5%S) (0.25%S) Forecast 1980 Forecast
150 650 650 650 650 1000 2000 3600
200 80 250 350 470 810 850 2720
250 80 250 350 470 470 750 2020
300 80 250 350 470 470 560 2000
350 80 250 350 470 420 470 1300
400 80 250 350 470 420 470 940
450 80 250 350 470 420 470 850
a Price are in 1977 dollars per ton of SO-equivalent. The four cases represent four assumptions
about natural gas prices under decontrol. The numbers in parentheses are the sulfur content of the
residual fuel oil at which the natural gas price is assumed to equilibrate. The "High" and "Low"
cases represent conditions of high and low natural gas supply under the status quo (i.e., no decon-
trol). "Actual" corresponds to actual 1980 fuel use patterns.
Source: Calculations by authors based on abatement cost data by source category.
For firms that can substitute fuels, the cost of compliance with environ-
mental regulations turns on the difference between natural gas and
residual fuel oil prices. Table 2 illustrates this by showing estimates of the
market-clearing price for a permit to emit a ton of S02-equivalent in Los
Angeles under four different assumptions about the price of gas in a de-
regulated environment48 and under the three cases discussed above in
which natural gas supplies are partially curtailed (the high, low and ac-
tual 1980 cases) and the price is equilibrated with high-sulfur residual
fuel oil. The competitive equilibrium price of a permit equals the margi-
nal cost of abatement; hence the differences in permit prices displayed in
Table 2 directly reflect the effect of the price and availability of natural
gas on abatement costs.
The abatement cost data that underlie the price data in Table 2 reveal
three interesting points. First, in all decontrol simulations the amount of
natural gas that is burned is the maximum amount that is technically
feasible. This point underscores the cost-effectiveness of natural gas use as
1982) (Doc. No. DOE/EIA-0173(81)13). Both studies are based on the assumption of deregulation of
gas in 1982.
47. Rogerson, Electric Generation Plants, in 3 CASs, HAHN & NOLL, supra note 14, at app. Fl,
describes the current and alternative standards for the sulfur content of residual fuel oil and their
effects on utility abatement costs.
48. Natural gas deregulation means more than the end of price regulation. It also means an end to
controls on the allocation of gas among users so that the natural gas market is allowed to clear.
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a control strategy. Second, the switch from residual fuel oil to gas repre-
sents the marginal abatement strategy in all decontrol cases in which the
emissions ceiling exceeds 150 tons per day. This means that, for these
cases, the price at which natural gas equilibrates with a particular grade
of residual fuel oil determines the price of an emissions permit. Third, the
price of a permit is generally lower under the four decontrol cases than
under the three cases representing the status quo. The only exception to
this pattern occurs when the price of natural gas is relatively high (Case
4) and the emissions ceiling is also high (in excess of 300 tons per day).
C. Uncertainties of Natural Gas Regulation
A firm that is subject to environmental regulation faces uncertainty due
to the presence of natural gas regulation during the past twenty years. By
artificially restraining wellhead prices and thereby causing a gas shortage,
regulation has deprived firms of information about the performance of a
deregulated market.49 Experience in the regulated market provides little
information about the ultimate market equilibrium, or about the extent to
which there will be periodic variability in price and availability, if gas is
deregulated. Consequently, uncertainty about unregulated natural gas
prices and availability in the future is greater than it would have been had
gas always been unregulated. In addition, there is uncertainty about the
future status of gas regulation. Although the present policy is to move
gradually towards full deregulation, it is by no means assured that this
progression will be completed and that gas will never again be regulated.
The history of the past forty years is one of episodic swings between more
and less regulation of natural gas, 50 and the pendulum may still be swing-
ing.5 In addition, it is unclear how severely gas supplies would be cur-
tailed by a reinstatement of gas regulation and how use priorities might be
established if shortages returned.
These uncertainties affect the desirability to polluting firms of a trad-
able emissions permit system. In a tradable permits system that has no
baseline set of source-specific standards, the total number of permits es-
tablishes an upper bound to emissions. Hence, all of the uncertainty about
the price and availability of natural gas translates into uncertainty about
the cost of compliance with environmental regulation, but not about air
49. For example, in an unregulated market the difference between contract price and spot price
conveys information about the expectations of producers regarding future discoveries and exploitation
costs. This information is useful for customers in making long-term investment decisions concerning
fuel burning equipment and abatement methods.
50. See M. SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938-1978
(1981).
51. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 7, 1982, pt. 1, at 24.
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quality levels.
The current standard-setting system of environmental regulation copes
with uncertainty about natural gas in a quite different way. Source-spe-
cific standards are usually input standards: For example, a firm must in-
stall a scrubber, or use a low-sulfur fuel.5 Because the availability of
natural gas is uncertain, regulators do not require its use. In Los Angeles
they require that some sources burn gas if it is available or low-sulfur
residual fuel oil if it is not. Electric utilities are required to use natural
gas if they can obtain it during the months when pollution is worst, but
otherwise to use residual fuel oil that has no more than 0.25 percent sul-
fur content by weight. This form 'of standard means that under current
regulations total emissions depend on the availability of natural gas. For
example, the 1977 standards would produce about 420 tons per day of
S02-equivalent emissions under the conditions of low gas availability that
threatened to emerge in the mid-1970's. Currently, emissions average only
about 350 tons per day, and if gas were totally deregulated we estimate
that emissions would fall to 250 tons per day." Hence, in the current
regulatory environment, both air quality and abatement costs bear some of
the uncertainty of natural gas availability. Adopting a system of tradable
permits in which the total number of permits is set equal to some baseline
rate of emissions would place more of the burden of this uncertainty on
polluting firms. This provides another reason for firms to resist a system
of tradable permits.
D. Coping with Natural Gas Uncertainties
A tradable emissions permit system can be designed to avoid the
problems arising from uncertainties about natural gas, but the solution
surely departs from a simple, unconstrained market for permits. There
are two basic ways to deal with these problems: (1) to introduce variabil-
ity into the emissions allowed by a permit and (2) to adjust periodically
the total number of outstanding permits.
Under the first approach, the face value of a permit, i.e., the quantity of
SO 2-equivalent emissions that it allows, could depend on the availability
52. A long list of current and proposed source-specific standards is analyzed in South Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist., supra note 42, and Cass, supra note 16. In every case, the standard is expressed
in input terms, and the point of the analysis is to calculate the emissions implications of adopting the
standard.
53. This estimate was arrived at by calculating the emissions that would result if all fuel users for
whom natural gas is a cheaper alternative than residual fuel oil made the switch in fuels. For details
of this and other calculations of how to achieve an air quality target with various combinations of gas
burning and other controls, see Hahn, Data Base and Programming Methodology for Marketable
Permits Study (1981) (Open File Report 80-8, Envtl. Quality Laboratory, California Inst. of
Technology).
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of natural gas. A permit would then be a contingent claim, subject to a
continuing regulatory determination of the current natural gas supply and
hence the emissions value of the permit. The variability in total emissions
under existing standards could then be incorporated directly into the vari-
ability in permit values. This is not easy to implement. A variable permit
value would greatly complicate the permits market, and would introduce
what is sure to be a time-consuming, expensive, and controversial regula-
tory process: formal determination of the availability of natural gas.
An alternative method of introducing variability into the value of a per-
mit is to overlay the permit system with natural gas usage requirements
- a system of regulations. The permits market would be relied upon to
establish the long-run allocation of emissions that would apply under pes-
simistic assumptions about gas availability. In the short run, holders of
these permits would be subject to additional gas-burning requirements if
gas were available. This is similar to the current rule that electric utilities
must burn gas if it is available during some parts of the year, but other-
wise must burn low-sulfur residual fuel oil. As long as gas remains less
expensive than low-sulfur oil, this requirement is not likely to be resisted
by regulated entities. Nevertheless, such a system will not allow the mar-
ket to produce a given level of total emissions at minimum cost for the
same reasons that current regulations do not produce a minimum-cost so-
lution. Regulators are simply not likely to have enough information and
flexibility to specify a cost-minimizing set of gas-burning requirements.
The second and perhaps more likely approach to the uncertainties
about natural gas is a permit system that establishes a firm ceiling on
emissions, but that also has a procedure for periodically reviewing and
adjusting the number of outstanding permits. This approach is not fully
consistent with the expressed philosophy of environmental policy to date,
which has tended to adopt an absolutist rhetoric: Air quality targets
should be set on the basis of health effects and other direct damages, with-
out regard to compliance costs or secondary economic effects of regulation.
The artifacts of this attitude include uniform national ambient air quality
standards for major pollutants - despite substantial regional differences
in the difficulty of achieving them - and nation-wide new source per-
formance standards.
Environmental policy also can be viewed as more a matter of practical
economics than of uncompromising constraints. According to this view, en-
vironmental policy objectives, such as ceilings on total emissions and am-
bient air quality standards, ought to depend in part on costs. Thus, higher
abatement costs due to rising prices or, under regulation, declining availa-
bility of natural gas ought to be reflected in policy adjustments. Current
source-specific standards, because they let changes in natural gas supplies
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affect air quality as well as' compliance costs, are actually more consistent
with the pragmatic view than with the absolutist position taken in envi-
ronmental legislation.
The political process is likely to change periodically the goals of envi-
ronmental policy. Knowledge about the effects of pollution and the atti-
tudes of citizens about the social priority to be given environmental pro-
grams can be expected to vary as well. Natural gas policy, too, may
continue to change over time. Consequently, uncertainty about the strin-
gency of environmental regulation is likely to persist. One natural way to
accommodate this uncertainty is to focus the regulatory process on peri-
odic reappraisals of ceilings on total emissions.
The periodic revision of the Clean Air Act, occasioned by its sunset
provision, achieves this accommodation only imperfectly." Because all as-
pects of the law are reviewed simultaneously, the process of revision fo-
cuses attention on general statements of policy and the approach to regu-
lation. With few exceptions, congressional revisions of environmental
legislation leave to regulators the task of making trade-offs between envi-
ronmental goals and other social objectives."' Because environmental goals
are typically stated as absolutes, regulators tend to write standards and
permits as if they were permanent, to be revised only if they fail to
achieve environmental objectives. 6
An alternative approach would be to have a regular expiration date for
a significant portion of emissions permits in each region in which a trad-
able emissions policy is adopted. Regulators would decide, in a formal
regulatory process, how many new permits would be created to replace
the expiring ones. Among the factors taken into account would be changes
in compliance costs, including the availability of natural gas, and new
knowledge about the effects of pollution and about the relationship be-
tween emissions and air quality. Regulators would also consider the im-
plications of changes in overall policy objectives as enunciated in current
versions of the relevant statutes, such as the Clean Air Act. Because these
proceedings, including subsequent and predictable legal challenges, would
be time-consuming, they could be undertaken only every few years. For
54. The authorization for appropriations expires periodically, and acts as the sunset provision that
triggers review of the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7626 (Supp. iII 1979).
55. Notable exceptions are the provisions in the Clean Air Act that deal with automobile tailpipe
emissions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521 (West Supp. 1981), and new source performance standards for coal-
fired electric generation facilities, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411 (West Supp. 1981).
56. The EPA has promulgated elaborate guidelines for state regulators on the procedures to be
used in adjusting source-specific emissions standards if ambient air quality objectives are not attained
by the State Implementation Plan. A major challenge to EPA was to figure out how traded emissions
could fit into this scheme. For a detailed discussion of EPA policy on this issue, see ICF, INC., supra
note 7, at 26.
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example, a permit life of ten years could be' adopted, with half of the
permits expiring every five years.
Periodically expiring permits could be allocated by the Zero Revenue
Auction described in Section 1.5' New permits would be provisionally al-
located among polluting firms in relation to the holdings of expiring per-
mits, but a compulsory auction process would be used to reallocate them.
The exact formula relating the provisional allocation of new permits to
holdings of expiring ones would be determined by the regulators, but a
likely possibility is that each firm would be given provisionally the same
fraction of the new permits that it held of the old.
A system of periodically expiring permits does not fully address the
problem that natural gas regulation creates for the implementation of
tradable emissions permits. In the short run, at least, emissions ceilings
would be fixed, and exogenous shocks to the system would be absorbed
completely by changes in compliance costs. But such a system would focus
the attention of the regulatory process on periodic reassessment of emis-
sions ceilings in light of new information about the costs and benefits of
regulation.
III. Public Utility Regulation and Electric Utilities
The generation of electric power in thermal facilities that burn coal or
oil is arguably the most important source of air pollution."8 For sulfur
oxides emissions, this is certainly the case; approximately half of all sulfur
oxides emitted in Los Angeles emanates from combustion of oil for gener-
ating electricity."' Obviously, the performance of any system of air pollu-
tion regulation will depend heavily on how it affects emissions by electric
utilities.
Incentive-based approaches to environmental control rely upon cost-
minimizing behavior by businesses to achieve an efficient allocation of
abatement responsibilities among sources. The assumption that electric
utilities will minimize costs is debatable, partly because of the effects of
public utility regulation. Utility regulators determine the amount of reve-
nue that a utility is permitted to extract from its customers by declaring
certain elements of cost to be recoverable. If utility regulators are more
likely to allow the recovery of some types of costs than others, or are
57. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
58. Thermal electric facilities rank at or near the top of the list of major sources of most major
pollutants. Their candidacy for the dubious honor of being the most important source of air pollution
is arguable, however, because the selection depends upon an assessment of which air pollutants are the
most serious problems. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 15, for a comprehensive listing of the most
important sources of the major air pollutants.
59. Cass, supra note 31, at 69-71.
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willing to let utilities earn greater profits on some types of assets than
others, regulated firms will have an incentive to depart from cost-minimiz-
ing choices of technology and operating methods. 0 The purpose of this
section is to consider whether public utility regulation is likely to treat
tradable emissions permits in a manner that leads utilities to be efficient
in balancing abatement effort and permit holdings.
In general, public utility regulators have been quite deferential to envi-
ronmental regulation. In California, for example, the Public Utilities
Commission has adopted the policy that for the purposes of ratemaking a
utility facility is not to be regarded as an electric generation plant and a
separate pollution abatement plant, but rather as a single facility with
identical principles of cost recovery applied to each activity." This means
that public utility regulation distorts incentives for most types of environ-
mental expenses no more than for other utility activities."" But for trad-
60. A voluminous literature has developed concerning the effects of economic regulation on the
efficiency of regulated firms. Much of this literature consists of theoretical examinations of the effect
of rate-of-return regulation on the input choices of regulated firms - the so-called Averch-Johnson
effect. This theory assumes that the method of regulation is to limit profits to a fixed proportion of
capital investment but to allow firms the freedom to set prices as long as the limit on profit rates is
satisfied. The fundamental result of ihe theory is that this kind of regulation will cause a regulated
firm to adopt excessively capital-intensive technology, assuming that the allowed rate of profit exceeds
the competitive rate of return. The seminal paper on this topic is Averch & Johnson, The Behavior of
the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. FCON. REV. 1052 (1962). In our view, this theory has
little practical application to the problems of contemporary public utility regulation because it incor-
rectly characterizes the focus of the regulatory process. Regulators control profits, but they do so by
regulating prices directly and by making decisions about the admissibility for ratemaking purposes of
the elements of utility costs. For a description of the regulatory process and a more compelling analy-
sis of the incentives it creates, see Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change
in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 632 (1974). For a survey of the
literature on the economic effects of utility regulation, see Joskow and Noll, Regulation in Theory
and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION I (Fromm ed. 1981). In any case, our
principal concern in this paper is not with whether there are distortions between capital investments
and other inputs, but with whether utility regulation is compatible with tradable emissions permits so
far as the admissibility of permit costs for ratemaking purposes is concerned.
61. Decision No. 89711, California Pub. Utils. Comm'n (1977).
62. The theoretical work on how utility regulation can cause input distortions can be used in ana-
lyzing the incentives facing a utility with respect to the acquisition of emissions permits. If emissions
permits are declared a capital asset for ratemaking purposes, utilities will treat them much like capital
investments in equipment for abating pollution. According to Avereh-Johnson theory, this would
mean that both permits and capital equipment would be more attractive than corresponding changes
in operating expenses, such as the use of lower-sulfur fuel. Alternatively, the theory propounded by
Joskow suggests that the business environment since the early 1970's gives utilities an incentive to
distort input choices in favor of operating costs instead of capital investments. See Joskow, supra note
59, at 325-27. In this case, low-sulfur fuel would be preferred to either increased permit holdings or
additional investments in abatement equipment. See Isaac, Fuel Cost Adjustment Mechanism and the
Regulated Utility Facing Uncertain Fuel Prices, 13 BELL J. OF ECON. 158-69 (1982). In both the
Averch-Johnson and Joskow theories, the results depend on the assumption that permits will be
treated as capital assets. This will not necessarily be done. Utilities could elect to lease the use of
permits, in which case the lease payments could be declared operating costs. This would enable a
utility to pass through changes in the leasing fee without formal regulatory review by using the fuel
adjustment mechanism, which applies to all operating cost categories, not just to fuel prices. This
flexibility means that the input distortions created by public utility regulation, whatever their charac-
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able permits, the policy of using identical ratemaking principles can be
disastrous, depending on how the policy is implemented.' The reason is
that ratemaking principles in widespread use by utility regulators are
likely to result in the confiscation of all utility revenues from permit sales,
while allowing no profit to be earned on initial permit holdings.
A. Ratemaking Methods and Emissions Permits
In most states the original cost method is used for incorporating the
costs of capital investments into the rate base of a regulated utility. Utili-
ties are allowed to recover annual depreciation plus a profit that is calcu-
lated by multiplying the allowed rate of return by the current depreciated
book value of the original expenditure on capital facilities that the regula-
tors have declared to be "used and useful" for public utility purposes."3
An alternative to original cost is the replacement cost method, whereby
the book value of the asset is periodically adjusted according to changes in
its market value. This method produces an estimate of the value of an
asset that accounts for inflation and for changes in technology that affect
the rate of obsolescence of an old facility. As a practical matter, the two
approaches yield essentially the same results. States using a method that
produces lower estimates of the book value of capital assets tend to com-
pensate by adopting higher allowed rates of return. 4
The neutrality of ratemaking methods is not likely to carry over to
tradable emissions permits unless they are allocated by auction. If
grandfathering is used, initially the utility will hold permits that had zero
acquisition cost. Hence, in original cost states the permits must be carried
on the books at zero value. No adjustment of the rate of return allowed on
this asset can compensate for a valuation of zero, which would cause origi-
nal cost states to accord a zero profit allowance to grandfathered permits.
A second problem is the treatment of capital gains and losses in utility
accounts. Most states use the principles in the Uniform System of Ac-
ter, are not likely to be an important element in utility decisions about permit holdings. For a discus-
sion of the precedents for treating permit costs as operating expenses and the implications of this
treatment, see Gerard, The Effects of Public Utility Regulation on the Efficiency of a Market for
Emissions Permits, in 2 CASS. HAHN & NOLL, supra note 14, ch. 5, at 184.
63. One element of public utility regulation is the determination of whether a capital facility ought
to be included in the rate base of a utility. The "used and useful" criterion refers to a form of
efficiency test: For a facility to be included in the calculation of recoverable costs, it must be providing
services to customers and doing so with reasonable efficiency. This part of the public utility process is
the defense that regulators have against excessive capitalization (Averch-Johnson effect) or simply bad
management and inefficiency. For a discussion of the process for determining the admissibility of cost
elements for ratemaking purposes, including a description of the "used and useful" test, see Gerard,
supra note 61, at 182-183.
64. See Primeaux, Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of Return, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 95-107
(1978).
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counts established by the Federal Power Commission. The Uniform Sys-
tem of Accounts requires that any gains or losses from the sale of an asset,
calculated as the difference between sales price and book value for
ratemaking purposes, must be passed on to ratepayers through adjust-
ments in utility prices." In original cost states, this amounts to a 100
percent tax on the revenue from the sale of a grandfathered permit. If a
utility sold permits because the costs of the compensating increase in
abatement were less than the revenues from the sale of permits, the reve-
nue requirements of the utility would initially fall dramatically. The reve-
nue requirement would increase by the increase in operating expenditures
plus the profit on investments for additional abatement, but it would de-
crease in the first year by the revenue from permit sales. The net effect
would be to force the utility to finance the capital investment in abatement
equipment from retained earnings or the capital market, rather than from
sales of permits. This is unattractive to utilities if the marginal cost of
capital exceeds the allowed rate of return, as it generally has since the
early 1970's. Even if the abatement method is to use higher sulfur fuel,
utilities still face a penalty: The higher costs of low-sulfur fuel can be
passed on to ratepayers, but the first-year revenue requirement must also
be reduced by the total revenue from permit sales. The net first-year effect
of an efficiency-enhancing trade, then, would be higher costs and lower
revenues. Hence, the capital gains provisions of utility regulation create
an important disincentive to sell permits and to make warranted further
expenditures on abatement.
Periodic auctions provide an appropriate incentive structure for utilities.
Expenditures on multiyear permits enter as capital assets on which the
firm can earn profits, and the periodicity of the auctions keeps the book
value of the permits near market value even in original cost states. The
problem, of course, is that a standard auction faces the same resistance
among utilities as it faces elsewhere: The auction increases the capitaliza-
tion requirements of a firm, even if it does not change the firm's operating
capacity, abatement expenditures, and emissions. What makes matters
worse in the utility sector is that here a standard auction generates politi-
cal opposition from within the government - specifically, from utility
regulators. Moreover, since utilities face higher marginal capital costs
than their allowed rate of return, both utilities and regulators are even
more resistant to new capitalization requirements.
The Zero Revenue Auction is unlike any institution that public utility
regulators have ever faced. Consequently, it is somewhat uncertain how
they would treat the permits acquired through it. Any net sale of permits
65. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS at 101-110 (1973).
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by a utility would most likely be subjected to the provisions for total cap-
ture of capital gains. Because the Zero Revenue Auction produces a final
allocation based upon a governmentally organized market process, regula-
tors probably would be inclined to use the resulting permit price to value
the final permit holdings of the utility for ratemaking purposes. But if the
new permits are to be regarded as acquired at these prices, it is also natu-
ral to regard the provisional allocation to have been sold at these prices.
Because the initial holdings are grandfathered, their sale is subject to total
capture by ratepayers in the year of sale. If so, the firm would have to
make a net reduction in electricity rates, equal to the difference between
gross sales of the provisional permits and the profits allowed on the gross
purchase of new permits. Like a standard auction, this would decapitalize
the firm.
In replacement cost states, none of the problems described above would
arise. The current price of permits would be used to readjust their value
for ratemaking purposes. Their sale would generate a cash reserve for
undertaking offsetting abatement investments, for other investment pur-
poses, or for a reduction in the capitalization of the utility by transfers of
capital to investors or to non-utility activities.
B. The Conflicting Purposes of Environmental and Utility Regulation
The obvious solution to the problem is to convince original-cost states to
adopt replacement cost methods for evaluating emissions permits. Unfor-
tunately, there are reasons to doubt that utility regulators will be enthusi-
astic about this proposal. The original cost method appeals to regulators
because of their reluctance to introduce any element of speculation into
utility planning, or to allow any significant amount of intangible assets to
enter the rate base."" For example, regulators do not want utilities to
speculate in land acquired for facilities and rights of way; therefore, regu-
lators tend to require that all capital gains on land transactions be passed
through to ratepayers.
The argument that regulators are likely to use against allowing emis-
sions permits to enter the rate base at replacement cost is similar to their
argument for recapturing speculative land gains. From the viewpoint of
the regulators, the utility paid nothing for the permit other than the costs
of participating in the environmental regulatory process and complying
with the resulting regulations. These costs have already been allowed as
part of the utility's revenue requirement. Thus, rising permit values are a
66. For a more complete discussion of the lessons for tradable permits systems to be drawn from
the treatment of intangible assets by utility regulators, see Gerard, supra note 62, at 186.
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windfall gain that ought not to be capitalized in the assets of the firm, and
that should be returned to ratepayers if ever realized through sale.
The counterargument is that utilities ought to be given the proper in-
centive to strike the most efficient balance between emissions and abate-
ment. But similar arguments about allowing replacement cost accounting
for assets such as land, water rights, and other intangibles have been un-
successful in the past because they conflict with the overall aim of regula-
tors to hold down utility prices to consumers. Thus, it is entirely plausible
that any method of allocating permits and making them tradable will be
undercut by regulatory decisions that remove much of the incentive for
participation by utilities.
In the specific case of sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles, public
utilities have been forced to engage in more extensive abatement than have
most other sources." Hence, we would expect that with grandfathering,
utilities would seek to increase permit holdings. They would then use
these additional permits to increase the sulfur content of the fuel burned
in electric generation facilities. Their expenditures on a net increase in
permits would allow a reduction in fuel costs and could be treated as a
capital expenditure on which the firm could earn profits. Regulators
would not need to let the grandfathered permits into the rate base in order
for utilities to face appropriate incentives in deciding how many additional
permits to acquire. Thus, the Zero Revenue Auction, with public utility
regulators allowing into the rate base only the net change in permit hold-
ings at the auction price, poses no special problems for this specific case.
This result assumes an initial situation in which utilities are overregu-
lated. States in which utilities have lower marginal costs of abatement
than other sources and in which regulators use original cost methods face
a significant political problem in trying to implement a system of tradable
emissions permits in which utilities will participate efficiently.
IV. Conclusions
Walt Kelley, the author of the famous cartoon strip "Pogo," once gave
to one of his characters the immortal line: "We have met the enemy, and
they are us." The problems of regulatory interactions warrant such a line.
Regulatory policies in one area can create serious political problems in
trying to implement a reform in another area and can lead to inefficient
market outcomes.
Tradable emissions permits are clearly an idea on the ascendancy. The
67. For a calculation of the change in permit holdings by utilities under various assumptions about
the ceiling on total emissions and the availability of natural gas, see Hahn & Noll, supra note 12, at
134-137.
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Environmental Protection Agency periodically issues policy guidelines that
expand the applicability of the concept, and that reduce the bureaucratic
" barriers to implementing it."' The California Air Resources Board is ac-
tively pursuing the possibility of experimenting with a full-blown market
for sulfur oxides emissions somewhere in the state, as demonstrated by
their continued support of and interest in our work on the topic. Yet these
initiatives face serious opposition because of the effects of other regulatory
policies: the constraints imposed by new source performance standards;
the implicit wealth created by existing permits; the uncertainties in the
future of fuel supplies and prices owing to the history of regulation of
natural gas and even oil prices; and the adverse incentives that current
methods of utility regulation create if they are used to guide decisions
about how permit values will be incorporated into the rate base of electric
utilities.
The solutions to these problems are straightforward in a technical
sense. In our work on designing a market for controlling sulfur oxides
emissions in Los Angeles, we have demonstrated how a resolution of the
wealth distribution issue can be directly incorporated into the design of a
permits market. The Zero Revenue Auction can distribute permits effi-
ciently and can accomplish whatever wealth distribution regulators would
like to achieve. Uncertainties about natural gas regulation (and regulation
of other fuels should it be reinstated) can be taken into account in design-
ing a market institution by introducing flexibility into the ceiling on total
emissions and the definition of an emissions permit. Finally, utility regu-
lators can adopt replacement cost methods or other cost-accounting tech-
niques that give utilities appropriate incentives to participate in an emis-
sions permit market.
These solutions require that a system of tradable emissions permits be a
more comprehensive departure from current regulatory policy than are
EPA's controlled trading options. The controlled trading policy seems to
entail a gradual expansion in the range of allowable trades. Two exam-
ples are the extension of the bubble concept to multiple plants and the
evolution of the offset policy to include emissions reduction banks. This
incremental approach deals effectively with only one of the issues raised in
this paper: It preserves the wealth created by current standards by using
them as a baseline from which trades can be made. On pure efficiency
grounds, the merits of the incremental approach can be questioned, for
68. Examples are emissions banking, which expands the offset policy so that the reduction in emis-
sions at one source can occur before the trading partner is identified, and the subsequent decision that
trades arranged through the offset and banking policies did not require amendment of the State Im-
plementation Plan and formal approval by EPA. See ICF, INC., supra note 7.
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there are reasons to believe that the resulting permits market will not be
competitive. Hence, the incremental approach will not result in an alloca-
tion of permits that minimizes abatement costs and will not go as far as
possible to facilitate the process of efficient change in technology and in
the structure of the economy. But even in the absence of these problems,
the issue of interactions between environmental and energy regulation re-
mains. Unless a permit policy is explicitly designed to account for these
interactions, the benefits of reform are likely to be substantially lessened.
The analysis in this paper focuses on a specific reform proposal: the
implementation of tradable permits for sulfur oxides in Los Angeles. This
case exemplifies a more general class of problems that arise in implement-
ing changes in regulatory policy that contribute to economic efficiency.
The economics literature on regulation correctly focuses on the efficiency
implications of alternative regulatory regimes and uses traditional tools of
welfare economics to aggregate the benefits and costs of reform proposals
to identify the most efficient policy.6 9 These analyses typically assume that
all other policies and institutions remain unchanged and that the distribu-
tional impact of proposed reforms can be ignored. The case study reported
in this paper illustrates two important points: (1) the contribution to eco-
nomic efficiency of a proposed reform can be greatly influenced by the
state of other regulatory policies, and (2) the effects of a change in policy
on the distribution of wealth can be very large in comparison to the im-
provement in economic efficiency. To the extent that effective political re-
sistance to a change in policy is motivated by the economic gains and
losses of well-organized groups, successful reform may require that con-
siderable additional work be undertaken to design a policy that not only
contributes to economic efficiency but also ameliorates some of the redis-
tributional effects. Most often the method of amelioration that is consid-
ered is direct compensation; however, as this paper indicates, another
method is to design the new regulatory regime to preserve some part of
the old private equities. This strikes us as an approach that has received
insufficient attention in the literature on regulatory policy.
69. For a comprehensive review of that literature, see Joskow & Noll, supra note 59.

